Terry Kinloch
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The Capture of Beersheba - 31 October 1917
The following notes are summarised from my new book, 'Devils on Horses: In the Words of the Anzacs in the Middle East 1916-19' (Exisle, 2007).
After the double failure of the EEF at Gaza in March and April 1917, both sides began a period of static warfare that lasted for the next six months. In May, General Murray ordered the Turkish railway line between Asluj and Auja to be destroyed. Raiding parties were formed from the ICC Brigade and the 1st LH Brigade of the Anzac Mounted Division. The rest of the Anzac Mounted Division protected the raiders from Turkish interference and the Imperial Mounted Division was ordered to create a diversion towards Beersheba. Eleven kilometres of line and five bridges south of Asluj, including one bridge with 18 arches, were blown up by the demolition parties accompanying the 1st LH Brigade. The cameliers destroyed another seven bridges and wrecked a further nine kilometres of line. The NZMR Brigade suffered no casualties. The ease with which these raids were carried out suggested to General Chetwode that the Turks did not expect any serious attack on the eastern end of the Gaza–Beersheba line. This started him thinking seriously about the inland option as an alternative for future attacks.
Two British Yeomanry brigades arrived in June and July, bringing the number of mounted brigades in the EEF to ten. Chauvel’s Desert Column was renamed the Desert Mounted Corps (DMC). He regrouped his horsemen into the Anzac Mounted Division under Chaytor, the Australian Mounted Division and the Yeomanry Mounted Division.
The success of the railway raid could not compensate for Murray’s double failure at Gaza and he was ordered to return to England on 11 June. His replacement was General Sir Edmund Allenby, the former commander of the British 3rd Army in France. The War Office expected Allenby to quickly break the Gaza–Beersheba line, to capture Jerusalem and finally to expel the Turks from Palestine entirely. Allenby refused to begin his offensive until he felt completely ready. General Chetwode presented Allenby with a detailed proposal to break the stalemate in front of Gaza. Chetwode envisaged infantry attacks on Gaza and the central part of the enemy line, to hold the Turks opposite them in place, while the high ground towards Beersheba was captured. This would force the Turks to evacuate Beersheba; after that, the rest of the Turkish line should be able to be rolled up towards the coast, aided by the EEF’s mounted divisions operating behind the collapsing enemy defences. Chetwode was confident that his horsemen could slow the withdrawal of the Turks long enough for the British infantry divisions to catch and destroy them; all they needed was water. After carefully evaluating all the options, Allenby accepted a slightly modified version of Chetwode’s plan.
On 12 August, Allenby arranged his forces into two infantry corps (20 and 21), and the Desert Mounted Corps (DMC). In all, Allenby had at his disposal 75,000 infantrymen, 17,000 horsemen and cameliers, and 460 guns. Four days after the commencement of an artillery bombardment of Gaza, Beersheba was to be captured by 20 Corps and the DMC. The infantry would attack Beersheba from the south-west, drawing the defenders towards them and capturing the heights overlooking the village to the west and south. At the same time, the DMC's Anzac and Australian Mounted divisions would ride in from the east and south-east and capture Beersheba and its vital wells. With the village and its water secured, 21 Corps would attack Gaza. At the same time, 20 Corps was to break through the other end of the main enemy line at Sheria and Hareira; the DMC’s roles were to protect 20 Corps’ right flank and threaten the Turkish line of retreat. The EEF’s longer-term objective was the Turkish railway at Junction Station: its capture would isolate the Turkish forces in the Judean hills around Jerusalem. Finally, Allenby would try to capture the Holy City itself.
Allenby believed there were 46,000 rifles, 250 machine guns and 200 artillery pieces, as well as 2800 cavalrymen, in the Turkish line or close behind it, and reinforcements were thought to be heading south. With the EEF seemingly safely blocked south of Gaza, the Turks had decided to try to recapture the Mesopotamian city of Baghdad with a new force called the Yildirim (‘Thunderbolt’) Army Group. Its German commander, Falkenhayn, wanted to use the Yildirim to attack the EEF instead, and, by mid-September, seven Turkish infantry divisions and Pasha 2 were on their way to southern Palestine – but they were too late.
The Anzac Mounted Division was ordered to leave Asluj at 6 p.m. on 30 October, and march to a position east of Beersheba. From there it was to cut the Hebron road between Tel el Sakaty and Tel el Saba and seize both hills. The Australian Mounted Division was to be prepared to advance into Beersheba, or assist the Anzac division.
The New Zealanders departed Esani at 5 p.m. on 28 October, bound for Khalasa. The men reached their destination at 9.30. After a day’s rest, the New Zealanders rode from Khalasa to Asluj, arriving at 9.30 p.m. on 29 October. Behind them, the Australian division rode to Khalasa. Allenby’s great concentration was complete by dawn on 30 October, which was a rest day for the 10,300 horsemen of the Anzac and Australian mounted divisions.
At 9 a.m. on 31 October, after an all-night march, Chaytor sent the 2nd LH Brigade cantering towards Tel el Sakaty to cut the Hebron Road and to protect the division from counter-attack from the north. The light horsemen successfully cut the road and captured the lightly defended tel, but they were unable to secure the hills to the west.
Tel el Saba, allocated to the NZMR Brigade, proved to be a much more difficult nut to crack. It was defended by about 300 Turks whose role was to protect eight machine guns that dominated the wadi and the flat land along its banks. The New Zealand brigade began its assault on Tel el Saba at 9.10 a.m. on 31 October 1917. The Canterbury regiment was ordered to cross Wadi Khalil and envelop the hill from the north, while the Aucklands attacked directly from the east. The Aucklands (as they were known colloquially) slowly advanced on foot, under covering fire from Vickers machine guns. The advance slowed to a crawl, and casualties mounted. The light shrapnel shells of the Somerset Battery were practically useless against the entrenched Turks and Germans, and the enemy machine guns were difficult to spot. At 11 a.m. Chaytor ordered the commander of his reserve 1st LH Brigade to send two regiments and a battery into the fight; at 1.30 p.m. Chauvel ordered Major General Hodgson to place one of his brigades and two artillery batteries at Chaytor’s disposal.
The 1st LH Brigade captured the blockhouses on the southern bank of Wadi Saba and turned the machine guns in them against the main enemy position. To the north, the Canterbury regiment crossed Wadi Khalil and threatened Tel el Saba from the north, but long-range fire from the hills overlooking the Hebron Road stopped them from reaching the tel. This support allowed the Aucklands to get very close to the first enemy position. Two or three machine guns and 60 prisoners were taken at 2.40 p.m. The guns were immediately turned around and used against the main defensive position. Twenty minutes later the Aucklands, reinforced by a WMR squadron and a light horse squadron, completed the job by charging the tel itself. As they clambered up the steep slopes, a number of fleeing Turks were shot down as they ran. 132 prisoners were taken, along with four Maxim machine guns and a camp cooker. Twenty-five Turks lay dead on the tel. Enemy aircraft and artillery bombed and shelled the tel and its environs for the next two hours. Eight NZMR Brigade men were killed and 26 wounded on 31 October, almost all from the AMR. Six horses were killed and 19 wounded.
Chaytor immediately ordered the 1st and 3rd LH brigades (the latter from Hodgson’s division) to advance immediately on foot to the northern outskirts of Beersheba, but they were hotly opposed and made little progress. The capture of Tel el Saba had removed the main enemy position dominating the eastern approach to Beersheba but the day was far advanced and the town and its vital wells were still in Turkish hands. With the sun almost setting, there was little time left to capture Beersheba.
General Chauvel had always intended to use the Australian Mounted Division for the assault into Beersheba, using a standard dismounted attack, but that was now out of the question. Instead, the 4th LH Brigade was ordered to lead a mounted charge into Beersheba, followed by the 5th and 7th Mounted brigades. Grant’s two leading regiments were ordered to carry their bayonets in their hands as they rode. The horsemen were ready to go at 4.30 p.m., just before sunset. They set off at a trot until the squadrons had spread out and settled, then they increased the pace to a canter. The last two kilometres or so were ridden at the gallop. At the first trench line, the 4th ALH Regiment killed 30 to 40 Turks before the survivors surrendered. Further south, small groups of men from the 12th regiment killed about 60 Turks, while the rest of the regiment galloped straight on for the town. Seeing the town invaded by these Australians, the Turks abandoned their defences and attempted to flee without stopping to destroy most of the wells. The New Zealanders moved forward from Tel el Saba to the edge of Beersheba, reaching it by 6 p.m. Half-an-hour later, Beersheba was firmly in the hands of the Desert Mounted Corps.
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